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國立臺灣大學哲學論評 THCI

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篇名 意義與意向是次性嗎?--萊特的依賴判斷理論之評析
卷期 34
並列篇名 Are Meanings and Intentions Secondary Properties?--On Wright's Judgment-Dependence Account
作者 鄭凱元
頁次 1-39
關鍵字 判斷依決理論次性意義意向規則依循Judgment-dependenceSecondary propertyMeaningIntentionRule-followingTHCI
出刊日期 200710

中文摘要

萊特(Crispin Wright, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998)在近年來提出一個重要的立場,認為意義與意向在形上本質上應被視為次性(secondary property)。萊特的立場建立在一個所謂的「判斷依決理論」(Judgment-Dependence Account)上,其基本主張為,如同某物是否屬於某顏色概念之外延,須得取決於認知主體對此物所做之相關反應或判斷,人所使用文字之意義與人所擁有心理意向之內容,亦須由人對它們所做的相關判斷所決定。

英文摘要

Crispin Wright (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998) has recently proposed that meanings and intentions be metaphysically construed as secondary properties. Just as what falls under the extension of a color concept is dependent on how a perceiver's relevant responses or judgments made under suitable conditions, the contents of what a person means by a term or of what a person intends cannot be determined independently of the person's relevant judgments. Wright's position is called "Judgment-Dependence Account", given the judgment-dependence nature of meanings and intentions.

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