篇名 | 意義與意向是次性嗎?--萊特的依賴判斷理論之評析 |
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卷期 | 34 |
並列篇名 | Are Meanings and Intentions Secondary Properties?--On Wright's Judgment-Dependence Account |
作者 | 鄭凱元 |
頁次 | 1-39 |
關鍵字 | 判斷依決理論 、 次性 、 意義 、 意向 、 規則依循 、 Judgment-dependence 、 Secondary property 、 Meaning 、 Intention 、 Rule-following 、 THCI |
出刊日期 | 200710 |
萊特(Crispin Wright, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998)在近年來提出一個重要的立場,認為意義與意向在形上本質上應被視為次性(secondary property)。萊特的立場建立在一個所謂的「判斷依決理論」(Judgment-Dependence Account)上,其基本主張為,如同某物是否屬於某顏色概念之外延,須得取決於認知主體對此物所做之相關反應或判斷,人所使用文字之意義與人所擁有心理意向之內容,亦須由人對它們所做的相關判斷所決定。
Crispin Wright (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998) has recently proposed that meanings and intentions be metaphysically construed as secondary properties. Just as what falls under the extension of a color concept is dependent on how a perceiver's relevant responses or judgments made under suitable conditions, the contents of what a person means by a term or of what a person intends cannot be determined independently of the person's relevant judgments. Wright's position is called "Judgment-Dependence Account", given the judgment-dependence nature of meanings and intentions.