「習俗」在法律史、法律人類學的研究佔有很重要的地位。在這篇文章，筆者主張我們現在稱之為「習俗」的範疇，已經歷許多階段的變遷，最晚近的例子是在當代「習俗」被視為作為反抗霸權的場域。當我們發現某些價值或準則可以被稱之為「習俗」，反而代表了我們有一個特殊的界定客觀性和規範性的看法。筆者要指出法律與習俗，這二個對立範疇之間的連續性與斷裂性，常常是多重動力的結果。本文透過法律人類學相關文獻對於「習俗」論述的考察，重新思考知識與權力的關係。最後，筆者提出法律人類學其實應該是比較性的，它必須對跨國界、跨學科的研究有其敏感度，才能不侷限在傳統而帶有規範性的價值或準則的界線內；更重要的是，它可以分析即使是法律這個被視為理性的系統，也是深深受到文化「觀看」的。

In this paper, I argue, the domain that we now call custom has been
radically restructured by the state's technology of social governmentality. Custom is never static and undifferentiated; it undergoes several phases of change. It is clear that, even in the West, traditions and cultural norms are integral parts of the modern legal system. In many non-Western contexts, on the other hand, the state might deploy languages of custom, namely customs (re)defined through law, to establish itself as a modernizing apparatus. In other words, the state’s effort to administer society on the
basis of maintenance of local customs was itself the foundation of modern institutions that necessitated the construction of those local organizations and practices. I not only want to argue that notions of "tradition" and "custom" were often rendered possible in the modern context. More importantly, I suggest that the continuity and discontinuity between modernity and traditional worldviews, as well as law and custom exemplify a vigorous dynamic in ways that invoke and redefine the meaning of law and modernity.