中央政府認為長期以來，地方政府對農地管理制度之執行，尤其是農地違規使用管制方面，偏向消極與保守。農地管理的相關研究，亦認為制度的執行有待改進，但大多基於規劃管制的角度切入，較少直接針對農地管理制度之執行結構與執行環境進行分析。因此，本文乃基於代理理論的觀點，依據台灣省各縣市農地管理的組織分工類型，選取六個執行結構具有代表性的縣，採用半結構式深度訪談法，以了解農地管理制度的執行結構，及其對農地管理制度執行的影響。執行結構主要包括代理理論觀點所提及的工作配置、誘因機制、訊息傳遞，以及本文所加入的人員特質等四種因素。另基於前述執行結構，是建立在既有的政治、法律及社經等執行環境的基礎上，故本研究再進一步地探討執行環境及其對農地管理制度執行的影響，最後並提出農地管理制度執行改進之思考方向。

The central government regards that the enforcement of the institution of farmland management, especially the enforcement of illegal use of farmland management by local government tends to be passive and conservative. The previous studies on farmland management also mention that the enforcement of farmland management is required to be improved, but they are mainly based on the viewpoint of planning control. There is less literature direct to study the institution of farmland management from the viewpoint of enforcement structure and environment. Therefore, this paper, based on agency theory and types of organizational job division to select 6 representative counties as case study, employs semi-structured interview approach to investigate the enforcement structure and its impact on the performance of the institution of farmland management.
The enforcement structure includes three elements emphasized by agency theory i.e. job allocation, incentive mechanism, information transfer, and one element added by this paper i.e. agent characteristics. Because the enforcement structure is established under the existing political, law and social economic conditions, this paper further investigates enforcement environment of the institution of farmland management and its impact on the performance of farmland management. A promising perspective is provided for the enforcement of current institution of farmland management