由於牟宗三的直覺理論繼承了康德（Immanuel Kant）直觀理論的感性（Sinnlichkeit）與智性（Intellektuell）二分的理論前設以及康德智性直觀（intellektuelle Anschauung）的非感性和創造性這兩個性質，使得其智的直覺理論產生兩個內在矛盾：其一，道德感情和道德興趣的感性與智性的矛盾；其二，本體的存在與創造的矛盾。於是，他在用直覺理論解釋中國傳統儒釋道哲學時就陷入難以克服的困境。根據胡塞爾（Edmund Husserl）的現象學直觀理論，感知（Wahrnehumung）的意向性（Intentionalität）事實上已經取消了康德感性與智性的截然二分，而他關於感覺（Empfindung）與感知的區分又為解決牟宗三[智的直覺]的內在矛盾提供了現象學的理論基礎，即，感覺是與[智的直覺]意義相當的本體直觀方式，但由於感覺是感性的和非創造性的，就避免了牟宗三的兩個理論矛盾，而感覺正是直觀的本義。

Mou Zong-san’s intellectual intuition contains two internal contradictions: first, a contradiction between intellect and sensibility
regarding moral feeling; second, a contradiction between being and creation of the thing-in-itself. These contradictions are caused by his acceptance of Kant’s theoretical assumption of a dichotomy between sensibility and intellect as well as by the characteristics of non-sensibility and creativity in Kant’s theory of intuition. In turn, this has led to unresolvable difficulties in Mou’s “intellectual intuition” reading of Chinese philosophy. While Husserl’s theory on the intentionality of perception resolved Kant’s dichotomy between sensibility and intellect, his distinction between sensation and perception also provides a phenomenologically based theoretical foundation for solving the internal contradictions of Mou’s
intellectual intuition: while sensation is equivalent to intellectual intuition as a way for intuiting the thing-in-itself, it involves sensibility and non-creativity, and therefore avoids Mou’s two theoretical contradictions.