當代上帝誡命論者在回應凡事皆可行反對論點時，大多訴諸上帝全善、慈愛或公義的本質屬性，主張上帝絕不可能命令我們去做在道德上極錯誤的行為。本文指出，上帝誡命論者若採取此一進路，在回應所謂以撒的綑綁問題時可能會遇上困難。有神論者在討論以撒的綑綁問題時有兩個常見的進路，筆者認為其中Kierkegaard的進路與前述回應凡事皆可行反對論點的進路並不一致。另一個進路（Kant的進路）雖然與前述回應凡事皆可行反對論點的進路一致，卻需要面對《聖經》記載是否真實的問題。本文建議，上帝誡命論者應重新審視回應凡事皆可行反對論點的另一種可能性。本文以康德倫理學為例，主張描述道德義務與禁令的真述句不見得是在邏輯上必然的。道德義務及禁令的必然性與道德述句的邏輯必然性常被人混淆，但二者實不等同。道德直覺所支持的是前者而非後者。凡事皆可行反對論點也因此未能否證上帝誡命理論。

Most contemporary divine command theorists have tried to respond to the anything goes objection by arguing that there are no possible worlds in which God commands us to do anything utterly wrong. I try to point out that such an approach is incompatible with a Kierkegaardian attempt by theists to deal with the akedah problem. While divine command theorists may adopt a Kantian solution to the akedah problem which seems in line with the fore-mentioned approach, they still have to deal with the question whether the story of the akedah is a historical fact. I, therefore, suggest that divine command theorists should consider another attempt to respond to the anything goes objection, that is, by denying that true statements about moral obligations and prohibitions are logically necessary. I argue that many people have mistaken the necessity of moral obligations and prohibitions for the logical necessity of statements about moral obligations and prohibitions, and that it is the former, rather than the latter, which is supported by our moral intuitions. Accordingly the anything goes objection does not constitute a genuine disproof of divine command theories.