本文採文獻分析法探討1991年至2005年間台灣修憲對兩岸關俘、的影響。本研究發現，1990年代的四次修憲雖未正式改變台灣的國號與領土範園，卻經由 兩岸人民權利的區分與中央政府制度的改變，實質上改變了兩岸關條。最大的變革就是把中國大陸上的人民視為「特殊的外國人J'而中國大陸則成了「特殊的外國J'為1999年李登輝總統宣示「特殊的國與國關條論」坦下伏筆。隨著修憲的展開，台灣逐漸放棄「一個中國」的政策，並因此而引起中華人民共和國的激烈反應。此外，修憲之後，台灣總統的法定職權擴大，成為大陸/中國政策的最高決策者，卻無須對任何機關負責，兩岸政策因此深受總統個人因素影響。另一方面，修憲後立法院擁有倒閣權，總統卻無權主動解散立法院，行政、立法兩權問對立的僵局缺乏解套機制。由於台灣社會長期存在著紛歧的國家認同，上述制度上的缺失遂使台灣在2000年至2008年間發生嚴重的政黨鬥爭，也無法制定穩定的大陸/中國政策。2000年以後的兩次修憲，則規定變更國家領土與修憲均須經過立法院提案與公民複決兩階段，此一變革表面上有助於維持台海現狀，實際上卻使台灣喪失一項嚇阻中華人民共和國動武的利器，未來除非台灣屈從中華人民共和國的意志，否則，兩岸關俘、恐將更不穩定。

This paper aims to explore the impact of Taiwan's constitutional revision on the cross-Strait relationship. The research method of this paper is document analysis. There were seven rounds of constitutional revision conducted in Taiwan between 1991 and 2005. This research has found that although the four rounds of constitutional revision conducted in the 1990s did not formally change Taiwan's official name and territory， it indeed changed the cross-Strait relationship through the distinction of the rights between the people of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland， and the redesign of Taiwan's government system. The most important changes were that the people on the Chinese mainland were now regarded as“special foreigners" and the Mainland “specialforeign country." These changes also paved the way for President Lee Teng-hui to release the “specialstate-to-state relationship" proposition in 1999. Consequently， Taiwan gradually abandoned its previous“one China" policy， which caused the PRC's drastic reaction. In addition， after the four rounds of constitutional revision， the president became the supreme policy-maker of the ROC (Taiwan) in the area of Mainland affairs. As the president is not responsible to any organ， Taiwan's China/Mainland policy is significantly affected by the president. On the other hand， after four rounds of constitutional revision， the Legislative Yuan has the power to initiate a no-confidence vote against the premier， while the president has not the initiative to dissolve parliament to check uncooperative opposition parties. Given that a chasm in national identity has long existed in Taiwan， the above institutional defects led to serious inter-party struggles between 2000 and 2008 when the DPP was in power. Consequently， Taiwan could not make stable policies toward the Chinese mainland. The last two rounds of constitutional revision conducted after 2000 stipulated that the proposal of both constitutional revision and the alternation of national te血itory needed to be passed by the Legislative Yuan first， and then agreed by the people through a referendum. Itis outwardly condusive to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan Strait. In fact， it deprived Taiwan of a useful weapon to deter China from attacking Taiwan， which also made the cross-Strait relationship more unstable， unless Taiwan submits to the PRC's will.