會計師簽發繼續經營疑慮意見必須權衡「經濟依賴」與「聲譽維持」兩個因素的影響，本文以存在危機警訊的樣本探討公司內部治理機制對會計師表示繼續經營疑慮意見的影響。對公司來說更換會計師的成本不高，而會計師卻有避免被更換的動機，致使會計師本質上會為了滿足客戶需求而使獨立性受損；此外台灣企業失敗引起的審計訴訟風險不高，降低「聲譽維持」誘因對會計師簽發查核意見的影響。實證結果發現會計師對於存有財務危機警訊的公司簽發查核意見時，客戶董監事持股比率與未擔任董監事的大股東持股比率越高，會計師會降低簽發繼續經營疑慮意見；客戶董監事股權質押比率提高或董事長有兼任總經理的情況下，會計師會提高簽發繼續經營疑慮意見的機率。

For a financially distressed firm, the decision of a CPA to issue a going-concern opinion must consider the trade-off between “economic dependence” and “reputation protection”. In this paper, we investigate the influence of corporate governance on a CPA’s going-concern opinion for financially distressed firms. As the cost to switch its CPA is inexpensive for a firm, the CPA has motive of not being dismissed. Such “economic dependence” consequently leads to a compromise of CPA’s independence. Moreover, since the probability of auditor litigation caused by business failure is low in Taiwan, the motive of “reputation protection” for a CPA reduces. Our empirical results indicate that the larger shares directors and supervisors hold, the less likelihood a CPA issuing a going-concern opinion. Similar results are found for the outside blockholdings. Where the shares of directors and supervisors are used as collateral and the chairman of the board also serves as the CEO, the likelihood of a CPA to issue a going-concern opinion increases.