無形資產已成為公司成長及創造競爭優勢的關鍵決定因素，近年來 科技日新月異，研發活動在企業價值創造過程中的重要性更是備受關注。然而，由於經營權與所有權分離，公司高階主管對研發的機會及其潛在的價值有較多的資訊，且其在研發上的努力無法直接觀察而得知；在道德危機與資訊不對稱的情況下，高階主管獎酬契約的設計，在激勵高階主管作出最佳研發支出決策上，扮演了重要的角色；會計盈餘與股票價格常被用來作為高階主管獎酬契約的績效指標，但是此二項指標並不能充分反應出經理人對研發活動所投入的努力。在一般公認會計原則的規範下，研發支出必須立即認列為費用，且研發資本並未在財務報表上認列。因此，如果使用傳統的盈餘數字（如資本報酬率或股東權益報酬率）作為績效指標來決定高階主管的獎酬時，會低估高階主管於研發支出所投入的努力，而無法給予高階主管誘因以做最適當的研發決策，並且降低了獎酬契約的效率。本研究結果發現當公司的研發資本較高時，經理人獎酬和傳統的盈餘數字敏感性下降，顯示董事會調整經理人獎酬契約以提高契約效率並避免給予經理人在研發資本管理上的不當誘因。

Intangible assets have become a key determinant for firm growth and the creation of competitive advantage. Widespread technological changes direct much attention to the importance of intellectual capital in the value-creation process. However, managers’efforts in such activities as R&D are not directly observable and managers are endowed with private information about the value and opportunities of the firm’s investment in
creating intangibles. In the presence of moral hazard and asymmetric information, the design of managerial compensation contracts plays an important role to induce managers to optimize the investment/management of intangibles. Accounting earnings and stock prices are frequently observed as performance measures in executive compensation contracts, but may not fully reflect managerial efforts in investing/managing R&D
activities. Under generally accepted accounting principles, R&D capital is not reported in firms’ financial statements and the investment in research and development are required to be immediately expensed. Thus, tying executive compensation to the aggregate earnings numbers, such as traditional ROA or ROE, may induce undesirable managerial behaviors
of over-/under-investment and reduce contract efficiency. The results show that the CEO compensation is less sensitive to accounting returns when firms carry greater R&D capital, suggesting that the boards of directors adjust executive incentive arrangements to discourage misallocation of managerial efforts on R&D activities.