本文藉由財政當局與工會採行非協調合作的方式，來檢視時序不一致的議題。本文發現央行官員提高對通膨的偏好權數，會降低社會福利水準。然而，當財政當局提高對政府支出比率的偏好權
數，以及工會提高對通膨的偏好權數，社會福利水準卻會提升。另外，本文發現通膨與產出波動彼此無抵換關係。再者，央行官員對通膨的趨避程度不會引起通膨與產出波動，此結果不同於
Rogoff 的命題。

This paper examines the time inconsistency issues by means of non-coordinated fiscal authority and union. It is found that a rise in
the weight assigned to inflation by the central banker depresses the
social welfare. However, the social welfare can be enhanced if (i) the
fiscal authority raises the weight assigned to the government spending
ratio; or (ii) the union raises its concern about inflation. It is also
found that there is no policy trade-off between the inflation and output
stability. Moreover, in contrast to Rogoff’s Proposition, we find that
the inflation aversion of the central banker plays no role in the inflation or output fluctuations.