本文旨在建立一個探討特產在產地零售價格訂價行為之經濟模型。在模型中，考慮特產產地消費者之訊息不對稱因素，利用賽局理論觀點分析特產在產地零售價格之訂價行為。結果發現部分特產零售業者訂價會比非特產產地的零售價格高，主因在於部分產地零售市場之消費者並不清楚特
產之市場行情，因而特產零售業者可利用此一訊息不對稱的因素，訂出比較高的價格，從中獲利。此外本文亦找出產地特產零售業者最適對稱策略均衡的特性及其存在之條件。

This paper attempts to utilize a game-theoretical approach to analyze
the pricing behavior of local specialty incorporating information
insufficiency. We find that when search does not cost, in a Nash
equilibrium, some vendors will charge higher than market price and the
others will charge at market price. The reason is that there are some
uninformed consumers who are not familiar with the market price. We
also find that the vendors have the optimal symmetric strategy which is
mix strategy: they charge at market price with a fixed probability (π*) and charge higher than market price with a fixed probability (1-π*).
Furthermore, if search is not costless, we find the sufficient and
necessary conditions of existence of a Stationary Symmetric Nash
equilibrium. We also characterize the Stationary Symmetric Nash equilibrium.