公司實施誘因報酬制度, 例如員工分紅入股制度或是員工認股選擇權制度, 是否能提升企業經營績效, 在既有理論與實證研究中一直沒有一致性的結論。本文應用傾向分數配對方法(Propensity ScoreMatching method), 根據企業特性變數是否相近為依據進行樣本配
對, 分析實施員工認股選擇權制度的公司與其反事實樣本(CounterfactualSample; 特性變數與實施員工認股選擇權公司極為近似,但未實施該制度之公司)的績效差異,趨近「其他條件不變」的要求,降低文獻中的樣本選擇偏誤。根據台灣部分上市電子公司2004年至2008年的資料我們發現, 實施員工認股權制度的公司績效並未顯著相對較佳, 以配對後的樣本進行分析亦未出現相反的證據, 採取員工認股權制度無法改善公司績效。

This paper fills a gap in the empirical literature which examines the impact of Employee Stock Options (ESO) on financial performance by considering and correcting for sample selection bias due to non-random sampling. Based on data from TWSE-listing hi-tech companies, we employ several propensity score matching method, developed by Rubin (1973), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985a,b), construct samples of ESO-firms and after-matching non-ESO-firms (counterfactual samples, without adopting ESO but sharing similar characteristics with ESO-firms) and then use regression analysis to examine their performance differences during 2005–2008. Our empirical results suggest that there is little evidence that ESO-firms outperform Non-ESO-firms. On the contrary, cash bonuses exert large and significantly positive effects on most performance measures in the regression results. Thus, we conclude that adopting ESO alone cannot improve financial performance.