法國哲學家米歇爾﹒亨利勾劃其思想為一「生命現象學」。提出了「生命就是自感」一口號。「生命現象學」之出現，乃是對胡塞爾的「超越現象學」和海德格的「存有現象學」之反動。簡言之，亨利認為古典現象學只注自於「外出性J '卻漠視了「內在性J '即忽略了「生命」。由於亨利認為「徹底的內在性」方是真正的「生命J '所以他要發展一套「生命現象學」來補救此一缺失。本文透過比較明朝末年的觀載山與亨利的思想，試圖指出兩者間的一些本質相似性，這可有助于見出載山之思想也是一套「生命的現象學」。然而相對於亨利之以「神學J 作為「生命的現象學j 之基礎的立場，聽山之思想可為「生命現象學」之發展另闢新途。依亨利、「父位的上帝j 是永遠不會直接為人所彰顯，其中必經通過耶穌基督作為中介，而且是可以自存的。不過，按載山之立場，雖然「性天之奧」使得「心體j 只能「逐步地」、而不可「全幅地j 彰著「性體J '但是這並不意謂其中有某些內容永不會被彰著;更重要的是:載山肯定「天非人不盡，性非心不體」。此外，於載山的進路卻可見出「純情」與「意」之本質性關連，這不會像亨利順著一根源性被動的情感而難以真正奠立「自我性J 。

In claiming that life is auto-affection, Michel Henry introduced aphenomenology of life. This signifies a critical reaction to Husserl's tran.scendental phenomenology and Heidegger's phenomenology of Being. Accordingto Henry, classical phenomenology is imprisoned in ontologicalmonism. He argued that it is only by returning to radical immanence thatsuch a limitation can be overcome. By disclosing the essential affinitybetween Henry's and Liu Zongzhou's philosophy, this paper aims to showthat Liu can be understood as a phenomenologist of life in Henry's sense.Nevertheless, in contrast to Henry's founding of the phenomenology of lifeupon Christianity, Liu provides a non-theological alternative. In addition,Henry's account for the possibility of selfhood might suffer from the lack ofphenomenological evidence. Such a difficulty can be blocked by Liu's stressingthe essential link between pure feeling and will.