環境種族主義顧名思義是在探討環境議題上與岐視相關的問題。由於事涉歧視的討論，人們多直覺認為相關判例的爭點，也必然集中在法哲學與道德的論辯上。不過，一旦仔細檢視這些經典判例，就會發現法庭上的攻防其實早已經「科學化」了。具體來說，兩造辯論聚焦在如何才能科學地證明岐視的動機與影響、以及怎樣準確測量岐視等議題上。通過這樣微觀的分析，我們清楚看見科學對法律的介入程度之大，幾乎排擠了原先應有的正義探索。對此，本文主張法學家應該認真看待現代社會中科學與法律的交錯，而不能自外於科學討論或冀望把科學的問題留待科學家去解決。

This article examines three leading but failed cases involving environmental racism and analyzes the implications of these cases for how
this concept is constructed in US courts. The courts have insisted that
accusations of environmental racism require proof of intentional discrimination. This requirement has created a high hurdle for successfully arguing such cases. These three cases illustrate how legal terms such as intent, discrimination, and racism have been viewed in a scientific manner.Although the application of science to law sounds objective or“scientific,” it is still very difficult to use science to measure and quantify discriminatory intent or racism. It is mistaken, this article argues, for activists to put all their eggs in the basket of science. The article suggests that activists should look for new perspectives on the conceptual foundations of environmental justice.