「奠基關係」問題是謝勒和胡塞爾交鋒的主戰場。在對胡塞爾那裡的「奠基關係」的批評和展開的基礎上，謝勒的根本意圖得以展現：即通過對範疇直觀及其內涵相對於感性直觀原初地位的張揚，去保證作為本質直觀的倫常明察及其相關項相對於表象行為的原初地位，進而去彰顯實踐理性相對於理論理性的原初地位，繼而在根本上突顯現象學倫理學的第一性地位。最終，這種第一性的現象學的倫理學奠基在愛與恨的先天論之上。而謝勒對胡塞爾的根本性批評就在於，在他看來，在胡塞爾那裡，純粹現象學進程的一貫性突然中斷了，現象學還原沒有被清楚地進行。

The dispute of Scheler and Husserl is focused on the problem of the
foundational relations. We see Scheler’s basic intention in his critique and development of that problem in Husserl. By showing the original position of categorial intuition and its content relative to sensuous intuition, the original position of ethical insights as eidetic intuition and its correlate relative to the act of presentation is warranted, the original position of practical reason relative to theoretical reason is highlighted, and the primary position of phenomenological ethics is fundamentally pushed out. Eventually, the primary phenomenological ethics
is founded on the apriorism of love and hate. Scheler’s basic critique on Husserl is that the consistency of a purely phenomenological procedure is interrupted and that the phenomenological reduction is not scrupulously carried through in Husserl.