在有關「衝突策略」的討論中，Thomas Schelling 指出，假如正在進行國際談判的執政者，刻意地運用其在國內所受的限制，那麼在對外談判中會有較大籌碼。類似的觀點也在Robert Putnam 的「雙層賽局模型」中提出。這一模型認為，當一國內部的贏方和國際上的對手打
交道時，此種外交談判的情境就會出現。Putnam 也指出，當一國內的贏方相對上沒那麼強勢時，在對外談判的過程中反而會有好處。這篇論文以雙層賽局模型以及Schelling 的觀點作為分析架構，檢視馬英九總統就CECA 或ECFA 和北京的協商過程。本文發現了若干個尚未被雙層賽局模型檢驗過的潛在預設。這些發現可以幫助我們瞭解，馬英九總統和北京進行CECA 或ECFA 協商策略的成功之處與限制所在，同時也有助於審視雙層賽局理論模型本身。

In the “Strategy of Conflict”, Schelling conjectured that if an executive
intentionally ties his or her hands with domestic constraints, he or she
may gain greater leverage in international bargaining. A similar point has
also been raised by Robert Putnam with his “two-level game model”. This
model argues that such a diplomatic bargain can be reached when domestic
win-set intersects with the international one. Putnam also argues that
when a domestic win-set is small, it can be a bargaining advantage for the
negotiator.This paper intends to review President Ma Ying-Jeou’s bargaining process with Beijing on the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Arrangement (CECA) or Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the analytic framework of two-level game and the Schelling
Conjecture. This paper finds some implicit assumptions that are not well
examined by the two-level game model. These findings may help us
understand the success and limitations of President Ma’s negotiation strategy with Beijing on CECA/ECFA, and also help us review the theoretical model of the two-level game.