現今恐怖攻擊為迅速達成大規模破壞，漸有協同化的趨勢。在孟買攻擊中，恐怖份子發動多起槍擊事件，有些攻擊的目的是分散維安部隊指揮官注意力，使得主要鎖定的目標中造成大量的傷亡。當都會區反擊的資源有限時，維安部隊指揮官必須重新思考：如何重新分配可用的維安部隊，以有效抵抗分散式的攻擊。本研究提出了一個兩階段、整合式的賽局模型，第一階段在每一起發生槍擊事件中，將維安部隊指揮官和恐怖份子之間的互動行為模式化在一個零和賽局，將每個賽局的恐怖份子期望報酬，當作一個槍擊事件的攻擊威脅值，並計算這些威脅值的門檻值。第二個階段利用所有發生槍擊事件的攻擊威脅值及門檻值，計算每一個槍擊事件的夏普利值。然後依據這些夏普利值重新配置維安部隊數量，以對抗協同化恐怖攻擊。數值模擬結果顯示：本研究建構的模型處理大規模協同式的槍擊事件比平均分配的方法需要較少成本。

In Mumbai attacks, terrorists coordinate to launch multiple diversionary gunfire events. The diversionary attacksare designed to divert the attention of the security forces in order to cause them to take a longer time to respond.This in turn enables the terrorists to cause more casualties at their main target. It is important to efficientlyreallocate the available security forces to meet these terrorist attacks, especially when the available resources arelimited. In this paper we proposed two game theory-based models for the reallocation of security forces for thepurpose of countering both primary and diversionary attacks in an urban environment. The first model is usedeach target and the “attack on hidden-object game” in which one analyzes the interaction behavior between thesecurity force commander and the terrorists within a zero-sum game. The terrorist threat value to this target isderived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The second model utilizes all these terrorist threat values tocompute the Shapley value for each target, in terms of the majority of all terrorist threat values for attacks. TheShapley values are then used to create a reallocated set of the security forces. Experimental results show theapproach proposed in this study is more efficient than the average method for dealing with ever more likelygunfire events.