防衛性民主的緣起甚早，然其重要性並未隨著時間推移而日漸消失，在21 世紀的今日，民主制度面臨各種新形態的挑戰，不變的是依舊受到內在反民主勢力之威脅。晚近以來，環繞於防衛性民主的爭辯，似乎已經不在於民主國家是否應有防衛性民主機制，毋寧是防衛性民主措施的制度選擇問題。應該如何設計一套切合國情的防衛性民主機制，成為當代民主國家必須面對的重要問題。本文聚焦於我國憲法上的違憲政黨禁止制度，由發展脈絡分析其病理，再以德國與美國法制為例，在理論上探討民主自我防衛的不同管制型態：價值模式與程序模式，並分析晚近以來臺灣違憲政黨管制模式的趨勢。本文認為，我國憲法上違憲政黨禁止之規定，是民主轉型初期的過渡產物，具有潛在之問題與相當之侷限，晚近以來我國正朝向程序取向的發展趨勢，而程序取向的管制模式，對於正邁入民主鞏固時期的臺灣，能帶來許多助益。然而，程序取向的管制模式亦有其隱憂，未來應該加強配套措施，以防止弊病。

The origin of “militant democracy” can be traced back to the early twentieth century, while its significance never wanes away as time passed. In the twenty-first century, despite new forms of challenges, the threat to democracy from inside remains critical. Recently, the primary arena of debate concerning militant democracy lies not in whether a democracy ought to possess institutions of self-defense, but rather in how to design the kind that works well in a democracy’s certain context. For modern democracies, it is now more a question of institutional choice. This article reflects on Taiwan’s prohibition of anti-democratic parties, in both contextual and theoretical perspectives. This article first examines the current institutions and analyze its drawbacks derived from the political context in which it originated, and then, with Germany and America as examples, demonstrates two models of regulating anti-democratic parties: the value-oriented model and the procedure-oriented model. Finally, this article explores Taiwan’s practices in recent years, discovering that it has embarked on the procedure-oriented model, and suggests that, while this shift brings Taiwan a better chance of further democracy consolidation, it is urgent to better regulations concerned so as to avoid potential problems in the context of democratic transition.