Aeronautical decision-making is defined by the Federal Aviation
Authority (1991) as ‘a systematic approach to the mental process used by
aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response
to a given set of circumstances’. This research analyzes 51 accident
reports obtained from Aviation Safety Council published between 1999 and
2008. Each accident report was independently analyzed using the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Statistical
relationships linking fallible decisions in upper management were found to
directly affect supervisory practices, thereby creating the psychological
preconditions for unsafe acts and hence indirectly impairing the
performance of pilots’ in-flight decision-making. It was observed that 68%
of accidents in this sample included a decision error. The results show
clearly defined, statistically-described paths with pre-cursors to pilots’decision errors at both the immediately adjacent and also higher levels in the organization. This study provides an understanding, based upon empirical evidence, of how actions and decisions at higher managerial
levels in the operation of the commercial aircraft results in decision errors on the flight deck and subsequent accidents. To reduce the accident rate resulting from decision errors in flight operations the ‘paths to failure’relating to these organizational and human factors issues must be addressed.