近年來隨著全球化與民主化的發展，我國中央與地方政府之府際關係由過去的上下指導關係，逐漸朝向府際夥伴關係發展，地方政府被賦予的角色日益重要。然而直至今日，我國財政資源主要仍集中在中央政府，地方政府始終缺乏自主財源。由於中央集錢又集權，使得地方自治難以完全落實。倘若中央在分配財政資源時，出現帶有政治考量的策略運用，恐更加不利於地方發展。有鑑於此，探討中央對地方補助款分配之模式與影響因素便饒富意義。具體來說，中央執政黨可能會將較多的財政資源投入到中央與地方行政首長同一政黨，亦即「垂直式一致政府」（vertical unified government）的縣市，以藉此掣肘「垂直式分立政府」（vertical divided government）下不同政黨的縣市長之施政。此外，中央也可能會以總統選舉的勝敗做為優先考量，而在資源分配上策略性地鎖定特定的縣市，以求將有限的資源發揮最大效用。據此，本文以1999年至2009年期間，台灣省21縣市政府的補助款為研究對象，探討中央在補助款分配上的策略為何，以及若干政治因素（總統選舉前一年、縣市長選舉年、執政黨立委比例）可能的影響。經由實證分析所得到的初步結論，本研究發現，「垂直式一致政府」未必使得中央政府挹注過多的財政資源支持同黨執政之縣市；相較之下，中央在補助款的策略分配上，傾向以總統選舉之成敗做為首要考量，特別是將較多補助資源投入到反對團體與游移團體的縣市，以達到拉攏甚或拔樁的效果。當然，政黨政治與府際財政關係牽涉我國民主發展甚鉅，係值得研究者持續關注的議題。

Globalization and democratization have changed the dynamics between central and local government in Taiwan from the previous hierarchical relationship to new forms of partnership, giving local governments a more prominent role. However, since most financial resources are concentrated in the central government, local governments still lack fiscal autonomy. With the central government controlling the money and power, it is hard to realize genuine local autonomy. If the central government takes political factors into account when allocating fiscal resources, this may be detrimental to local development. In this regard, it is meaningful to study what factors may affect the allocation of central governmental grants. Specifically, incumbent presidents may be inclined to favor magistrates and mayors of the same political party. On the contrary, in cases of vertical divided government where central and local governments are controlled by different political parties, local governments may lose their advantages in attaining central fiscal grants. Moreover, the central government may also have other political considerations when deciding on the allocation of grants such as winning more votes in presidential elections. By analyzing the allocation of intergovernmental grants among 21 counties and cities between 1999 and 2009, this study explores the effects of intergovernmental relations and political factors, such as election year (presidential and local) and the number of seats held by the ruling party in the Legislative Yuan, on the allocation of grants. The results reveal that the central government does not in fact over-reward local governments held by the same party. In addition, neither election years nor seat-share in the Legislative Yuan make a significant difference to grant distribution. In contrast, winning presidential elections is a top priority for the central government. Therefore fiscal resources tend to flow to local governments in areas in which the incumbent president lost or encountered a tight race in the preceding presidential election. This suggests that the central government tends to target opposition-held areas and areas where there is strong competition between the two parties with the hope of “stealing” opposition support. Finally, this study argues that fiscal intergovernmental relations are an important factor in Taiwan’s democratic development and deserve further attention from researchers.