依照信號發射理論，資訊不對稱程度越大的公司，以股利作為信號的價值越高，所以資訊不對稱較大的公司，會採取高股利政策。不過，融資順位理論卻指出，資訊不對稱不利於外部融資，因此，資訊不對稱較大的公司，會採取低股利政策。本文主要目的在檢驗資訊不對稱對股利政策的影響，不同於過去文獻，本文以市場微結構文獻所發展方法衡量資訊不對稱衡量，並使用結構方程模式降低衡量誤差問題。實證結果發現，資訊不對稱程度與股利收益率為負向關係。此項證據支持融資順位理論，而與信號發射理論不一致。

According to the signaling model, the value of dividend payments as a signal increases with the level of asymmetric information. However, the pecking order theory predicts that the higher the level of asymmetric information, the lower the dividends. Using the measures of asymmetric information developed by the market microstructure literature, we examine the effect of asymmetric information on the dividend decision. The structural equation modeling technique is employed to mitigate the measurement problem of latent variables. The evidence shows that the dividend yield is inversely to the degree of asymmetric information. We conclude that the pecking order theory is supported, but the signaling view is not.