本文利用 Hotelling 模型，探討兩個城市的地方政府在吸引外國廠商進駐投資時，最適的都市發展類型（專業型、綜合型）、基礎建設投資水準以及租稅競爭。兩地方政府的都市發展類型愈不對稱以及基礎建設投資水準差異愈大皆會造成租稅競爭的強度減緩。當都市發展類型為內生決定時，最適都市發展類型為盡可能的往綜合型城市發展，且可降低租稅競爭。另外，綜合型程度相對愈高者，其基礎建設投資水準會愈高，愈有能力訂定較高的投資定額稅。考慮基礎建設具有外溢性時，在都市發展類型為對稱發展的情況下，外溢性不會對最適都市發展類型選擇造成改變，但在都市發展類型為非對稱發展時，外溢性愈強都市發展類型會更趨綜合型發展，但卻使得租稅競爭更激烈。

This paper applied a Hotelling model to analyze the optimal city type (i.e., specialized or non-specialized), infrastructure investment level, and tax competition while considering that two regions compete for foreign direct investment. When city types are exogenous, it shows that
asymmetrical city types or a discrepancy between levels of infrastructure investment can reduce the tax competition intensity. When city types are endogenous, the optimal city types move as far as possible toward non-specialized urban development. Moreover, as the degree of non-specialization increases, infrastructure investment increases, increasing the lump-sum tax. By considering infrastructure investment with spillovers, there is no effect of regional spillovers on the optimal
infrastructure choice in symmetrical infrastructure types; however, as regional spillovers increase,the city type tends to be non-specialized and reduces the tax competition intensity in asymmetrical infrastructure types.