逃漏稅不僅影響政府財政的健全, 同時也造成稅負上的不公, 但受限於資料的缺乏, 以及理論架構的不足, 遺產稅的逃漏稅行為相對受到較少的探討。 本研究估計國內遺產的漏報行為, 利用民國82–87年和民國92–94年國稅局遺產申報的稽核資料,估計稅率、 稽核程度和遺產總額對於漏報行為的影響。 本研究發現, 納稅人漏報的遺產會隨邊際稅率和遺產總額提高而增加,但面對較嚴密的稽核或較高的稽核機率, 則會降低漏報的遺產。 此一結果與相關文獻的結論一致, 認為較高的稅率提高遺產漏報成功的邊際報酬, 因此導致較多的漏報行為, 而稅務機關投入的人力物力, 則能有效抑制逃漏稅行為。 惟本研究所依據的稅務機關稽核後的遺產申報資料, 僅能呈現實際短漏報的一部份。

Tax noncompliance affects not only government revenue but also the fair-
ness of the tax system. However, empirical studies on noncompliance with
the estate tax are rare. This study utilizes the audited estate tax returns for
1993–1998 and 2003–2005 from Taiwan’s National Tax Administration to
analyze the determinants and magnitude of the underreporting of estates.
We find that the underreporting of estates increases with marginal tax rates
and the amount of the estate, but declines with tax auditing. The results are
consistent with most of previous theoretical and empirical studies on non-
compliance with the income tax and the estate tax. Previous studies generally
find that a tax increase raises taxpayers’ incentive to underreport estates ow-
ing to a higher marginal reward of successful evasion. In contrast, a higher
tax audit probability can effectively deter taxpayers’ underreporting behav-
ior. One limitation of this study is that the data from audited tax returns
may reveal only a part of actual noncompliance.