代理理論主張，總經理薪酬應與經營績效連結，並且應考量影響公司經營
績效的不確定性因素。依循情境理論，總經理薪酬之決定愈符合情境因素時，
公司營運績效應愈好，但過去在此方面的研究甚少，本研究依循此一觀點，探
討總經理薪酬、績效衡量及公司面臨之不確定性間的配適程度與公司營運績效
是否為正相關。本研究以整合性的觀點來捕捉不確定性，包括盈餘雜訊、股票
報酬風險與營運風險，而績效衡量指標則包括會計績效與非會計績效衡量指標。
本研究以台灣證券交易所公開上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，實證結果發
現，當總經理薪酬與公司面臨之不確定性因素及績效衡量之配適度愈好時，公
司營運績效表現愈好。若為配適度不佳者，包括總經理薪酬給付不足或給付過
多，均有損於公司營運績效。

Agency theory advocates that CEO compensation should tie to firm
performance to better align managers’ and shareholders’ interests. The factor of
uncertainty can not be neglected in determining CEO compensation. Following
contingency theory, firm performance should be higher when contextual factors
and compensation are aligned than when they are not. Prior research pays little
attention to this issue. This study fills this gap to probes that firm performance is
superior when CEO compensation is more aligned with performance measures and
uncertainty factors. Uncertainty factors are captured by noise in earnings, risk of
stock return and operating risk. The performance measures are measured through
accounting and non-accounting performance measures.
The research samples aim at listed firms in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and
OTC stock exchange. The empirical results indicate the greater the alignment
between CEO compensation, performance measures and uncertainty factors, the
better firm performance consequence is. The firms with worse alignment,
including CEO overpayment and CEO underpayment, would get less performance.