本文探討在垂直相關市場下產業內技術授權廠商的最適授權決策。此一授權廠商生產並出售一中間財貨給予下游廠商,且可採用單位權利金(royalty licensing) 或固定權利金(fixed-fee licensing) 的方式將其技術授權給另一家上游的競爭廠商。本文發現技術授權廠商的最適授權方式可能為固定權利金;藉此下游的潛在廠商較可能進入最終財市場並提高中間財的衍伸性需求。此外, 即使這兩種授權方式皆導致下游的潛在廠商進入市場, 固定權利金仍可能優於單位權利金。其原因在於: 當採用單位權利金的方式來授權時, 技術授權廠商必須降低單位權利金來使下游的潛在廠商進入市場,而導致其利潤下降。

This paper investigates the optimal licensing strategy of an insider licensor, which produces and sells an intermediate good in a vertically related market. The licensor can adopt either fixed-fee or royalty licensing. It is found that the licensor firm may prefer fixed-fee to royalty licensing as the former is more likely to induce downstream entry which expands the derived demand. Moreover, even if downstream entry takes place under both regimes, fixed-fee licensing could still be superior to royalty licensing, because the licensor, in order to make room for the entry, cannot enjoy the full cost advantage under royalty licensing.