本文設立一個包括垂直相關市場的三階段賽局模型,定義中間財價格為中間財獨占價格與其邊際成本的線性組合。本文主要在探討當產業外授權廠商授權給上游廠商時, 上游廠商的獨占力程度在最適授權策略的決策中所扮演的角色。本文發現當上游廠商的獨佔力相對小(大) 時, 無論創新程度(innovation size) 為何, 最適授權策略為單位權利金授權(固定權利金授權)。其次, 本文發現提高雙重邊際化程度, 可藉由為產業外授權廠商的授權策略由單位權利金授權變成固定權利金授權, 提升社會福利水準。再者, 本文証明當創新程度夠大時,即使完全消除雙重邊際化, 社會福利水準仍維持不變。最後, 本文也考慮了兩部授權策略下的最適授權策略與其對社會福利的影響。

This paper develops a three-stage model in which the input price is expressed by a combination of its monopoly input price and marginal cost. The focus of this paper is on the role of the upstream firm in terms of the degree of its monopoly power in the choice of the outsider patentee’s optimal licensing contract, as the outsider patentee licenses its innovation to the upstream firm. The paper shows that the outsider patentee prefers royalty (fixed-fee) licensing to fixed-fee (royalty) licensing when the degree of the upstream firm’s monopoly power is small (large) regardless of the innovation size. This paper shows that a rise in the degree of double-marginalization may improve the social welfare through the outsider patentee’s switching from royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing. It also proves that social welfare remains unchanged by the elimination of double-marginalization when the innovation size is large. Finally, the paper is extended by taking into account a two-part tariff.