羅森堡（2006）主張生物學化約論。但他所鼓吹的化約論是「達爾文式的」，這指的是達爾文所發現的天擇在決定生物學化約論應該採取什麼形式，以及化約能夠進行到的最低層級為何等問題上，都發揮了舉足輕重的關鍵作用。由於目前大多數的生物學哲學家皆為反化約論者，所以羅森堡在論證時先針對他們的三項考量作出診斷：第一，內格爾（Nagel）的化約模型無法應用在生物學上第二，麥爾（Mayr）在臨近說明（proximate explanation）和終極（ultimateexplanation）之間所作出的區分。第三，杜布然斯基（Dobzhansky）的名言：除非從演化來看，否則生物學中沒有任何一件事情說得通。在這篇論文中，我將批判地檢視羅森堡的達爾文式化約論是否成立。我會先說明並且分析羅森堡如何藉著重新檢討上述的三項考量，而得出達爾文式化約論的主張。之後，我將論證達爾文式的化約論隱含有內在的張力：它既是達爾文式的，也是內格爾式的。在如此之張力的局限之下，第一、它很難說服如同麥爾一樣主張生物學享有完全自主性與獨特性的生命科學家們。第二、它也無法追求理想的內格爾式的科學化約圖像；它甚至也無法交代為什麼在理化科學的所有定律之中，天擇原理會如此與眾不同。第三、它會使得天擇原理無法與物理主義相吻合。我的結論會是：在探討生物學的說明或化約模式時，不應該比照理化科學從定律取向來進行，而是應該更顧及生物學之獨特的學科特性。

Rosenberg (2006) argues for reductionism in biology, and he has a special name for the position he adopts: Darwinian Reductionism (DR). The reason why it is dubbed Darwinian is that natural selection plays a key role in answering questions as to what form reductionism should take and what is the lowest level that biological explanations can be reduced to. Given that most contemporary philosophers of biology are anti-reductionists, Rosenberg begins his argument with a diagnosis of why they have been led to embrace the antireductionism: (1) the inapplicability of Nagelian account of reduction between proximate and ultimateexplanations; and (3) the literal truth of Dobzhansky’s dictum that nothing in
biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. In this paper, I will
critically examine Rosenberg’s DR. I will begin with an analysis of how
Rosenberg responds to the anti-reductionists’ considerations, and how he is
led step by step to DR. Then I will argue that an internal intension is implicit in DR, for it turns out to be not only Darwinian, but also Nagelian. Such an intension, as I will argue, brings some troubles to DR: (1) DR has difficulties convincing biologists who agree with Mayr that biology, as a discipline, is unique and autonomous. (2) DR is forced to abandon the ideal unification ofall physical sciences, based on the Nagelian account of reductionism. In addition, DR has difficulties explaining why the principle of natural selection, among all laws in the physical sciences, turns out to be the only one law in its kind. (3) Ironically and to Rosenberg’s surprise, DR has difficulties
rendering the principle of natural selection compatible with the physicalism.
The critical examination of DR leads me to the conclusion: if we aim to
figure out how explanation and reduction in biology proceed, instead of
confining ourselves to the law-based account, which is modeled on the
physical sciences, we should pay more attention to how biology is distinct
from the physical sciences.