次貸風暴後，系統風險被認為係金融規範上最重要之議題。惟因對其成因尚無統一見解，於法規範設計上之看法亦有所不同。於系統風險實現後，是否應進行紓困亦具高度爭議。本文認為，系統風險之成因在於金融機構間之連結，此種連結來自於金融機構因直接交易所生之相對人風險，及因市場信心及價格機制所導致之市場感染，並以後者為主要原因。系統風險之外部性特質使法規範之介入有其必要性。於事後處理機制之設計上得以破產法程序為藍本，使具系統重要性之金融機構進入由主管機關所主導之特殊處理程序。為降低對市場所生衝擊，應賦予主管機關完整之市場紓困權限，對特定金融機構紓困部分，則應結合實證研究評估我國金融市場狀況認為必要後再行為之。如認為仍有對該金融機構之利害關係人進行紓困之必要，得考量美國華爾街改革法所設立之秩序清算程序中，授權主管機關先行對特定債權人進行償付，並授權主管機關於市場恢復正常後就其溢領數額償還之作法，以降低系統風險。

Reducing systemic risk has deemed to be the most urgent issue for financial reform. Due to the lack of consensus regarding causes of systemic risk, legislations suggested have raised serious disagreements. This article suggests that the fundamental cause of systemic risk is the interconnectedness among financial institutions. Such interconnectedness derives from counterparty risk incurred by direct transaction, and market contagion caused by the collapse of market confidence or price. The externality nature of systemic risk, together with the moral or cognitive failure of market participants, makes the market unable to address systemic risk itself. To design an ex post resolution regime, some bankruptcy mechanisms could also use as the blueprint. To mitigate the shock to the market systemic important financial institution creates, the financial authority should be allowed to provide liquidity to the market. As to bailout specific financial institution, further empirical studies to Taiwan’s financial m arket are required before making such determination. If bailout is deemed inevitable in Taiwan, the moral hazard created by bailout could be reduced by careful design of bailouts and liquidation mechanism. It can be done by paying off creditors necessary to maintain the financial institution’s operation, and clawing back afterward when the market returns normal.