近來的品格論戰屮，悄堍綸ff嘐家弑阔挑戰Aristotle及我們H常的品格觀。 本文旨在探討「品格之說」面對道挑戰足否得以存綃，並则明這對品格特KWW 與評量之可行性與做法的啟示。笊汽將綸鎞品格論述的正常性固然未受拟似，mm 確竹對於我們日常的品格特與,if h〖的W踐捉出嚴城的知識論挑戰，f?疑我們 「是否」與「如何」可能認識他人的品格狀態。在為品格特贤歸闶與評W的可行性 辯護的同時，筆者將_明怡堍論挑戰的Wfl蘊施：1、鑑於品格的多面性特K，必 須從各種曆面包含行為表現與心理狀態，拇取品格特KPrfW與評W所需嫂的資訊。 2、品格的「碎裂性』突顯道德品格的幣體性評h〖在知識論t是無法被證成的， 可行的是品格特質評秘。3、無論就經驗或倫理適當性，「區域性特質詞兌」部比 ^概括性特質詞镇」適當，這有助於修正品格特PCWW與評W的語言。

Situational philosophers attempt to question our ordinary conception of character and particularly that of Aristotle. The aim of this paper is to adjudicate whether character discourse can survive this challenge and elucidate its implications for the viability and practice of character trait attributions and evaluations. The author will argue that notwithstanding the legitimacy of character talk is kept intact, it does pose a real epistemologica重 challenge to our day-to-day character-related practice，specifically questioning whether and how we could possibly come to know any other people’s states of character. As defending the feasibility of character trait attributions and evaluations, the author will also expound some important lessons for the issue under consideration. Firstly, considering the multidimensional nature of character，the required epistemological resources for the sake of making character trait attributions and evaluations are multifarious, at least including knowledge of behavioural performance and moral psychology. Secondly, given the actuality of fragmentation of character, making moral evaluations of character as a whole is epistemologically unwarranted, and instead localised assessments of character traits are justifiable. Thirdly, local trait terms are preferable to general trait terms both in terms of empirical and ethical adequacy. This helps to improve the language in which character trait attributions and evaluations can be made appropriately.