基於股東行動主義、公司社會責任理論以及少數股東之權利保護等思潮之興起與盛行，我國公司法亦於 2005 年修正時引進股東於股東會之提案權（shareholders’ proposal），賦予股東更積極參與公司決策作成之地位，並使公司股東會能夠有機會討論來自董事會以外之提案內容，以落實公司社會責任並保護少數股東之權利。惟此一制度引進之後施行多年迄今，不僅在提案權行使之統計資料上有所欠缺，在法制上或條文解釋方面亦存在不少問題，而有進一步詳細檢討之必要。本文擬首先以美國法制規定下之股東提案權為比較模型，討論股東提案權之性質、行使之要件、再次提案之限制及其權利之救濟方式等，尤其我們必須瞭解美國法制下股東提案權係經由聯邦證券交易法之相關規則所賦予，並非直接規定於聯邦證券法或證券交易法，而相關州之公司法對於股東提案權亦無直接規定，與我國直接規定於公司法中有所不同。在瞭解美國法制之基本後，再進一步討論我國公司法現行法制下上述問題之對照觀察，以對股東提案權之屬性進行探討，並論其行使之限制與程序要件，更重要者為股東之合法提案被董事會違法拒絕時，因為股東提案權之提出時點與股東會擬召開之時點具有緊密之關係，無法經由冗長之訴訟程序給予適當之救濟，故何種救濟方式較能有效的並適合的提供股東提案權之救濟，為本文論述之重點之一。

Based upon the theories of shareholders’ activism, corporate socialresponsibility, and the protection of minority shareholders, Taiwan adopted theShareholders’ Proposal Mechanism into its Company Code in 2005, whichgrants the shareholders, under certain conditions, to submit his/her proposal tothe general shareholders meeting and request for discussion and vote in theshareholders meeting. This new mechanism grants the shareholders with a moreactive role to participate the policy making process in the company and makethe shareholders be able to hear voice from other shareholders to carry on itssocial responsibility and protect the minority shareholders’ rights. However,since the amendment of the Company Code in 2005, there is no statistical datafor the shareholders’ proposal and some gaps in the current mechanism, whichmake the author tries to carefully examine this mechanism again. The author inthis article will first use the U.S. legal mechanism as the comparative model toexamine the nature of the shareholders’ proposal, its requirements for exercising,its resubmission and its legal remedies. The readers should be aware of that theshareholders’ proposal right was granted by the regulation issued by the SECaccording to the 34 Act, there were no shareholders’ proposal right been granteddirectly from the 33 Act or 34 Act or other states’ company acts. This isdifferent from the current mechanism of Taiwan. Furthermore, the author willexamine the above mentioned issues under Taiwan’s mechanism, such as itsrestrictions and procedure requirements, its possible legal remedies when theboard of director illegally refuses a lawful proposal. Especially, since theshareholders’ proposal is usually very close to the time of shareholders meeting,it is impractical to grant its remedy through the litigation process. Thus, thepotential and applicable remedies are the main issue in this article for the authorto discuss and then the author will try to make a short conclusion in the end.