篇名 | 公司出售或控制權出售時之股東利益最大化原則-論德拉瓦州法院 Revlon/QVC Doctrine 之適用範圍 |
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卷期 | 87 |
並列篇名 | The Doctrine to Maximize Shareholders’ Interests when Corporate Put for Sale or Sale of Control-Study on the Applicable Scope of the Delaware Supreme Court Revlon/QVC Doctrine |
作者 | 林國彬 |
頁次 | 119-176 |
關鍵字 | 公司出售 、 控制權出售 、 企業併購 、 受任人義務 、 股東利益最大化 、 股東利益衝突 、 其他利害關係人 、 公司社會責任 、 Corporate for sale 、 sale of control 、 mergers and acquisitions 、 fiduciary duties 、 maximize shareholders’ interests 、 shareholders’ interests conflict 、 other constituency 、 corporate social responsibility 、 Revlon Duty 、 Revlon/QVC Doctrine 、 TSSCI |
出刊日期 | 201309 |
公司董事會對公司及全體股東負有受任人義務,然而不同持股目的之 股東彼此間以及股東與公司間,即可能因其持股目的之不同而產生對利益 認定之不同,或對不同股東群體間產生不同的利益程度影響,而公司董事 會在處理相關事宜時係必須以全體股東或公司爲利益思考之方向,但在公 司處理企業倂購交易事宜時,此種衝突性將更爲明顯,例如以經營爲目的 之股東與以財務投資爲目的之股東對於倂購交易即可能有不同之立場,此 時董事會究竟應以何種標準進行公司或全體股東之利益判斷,即有可爭議 之處。我國企業倂購法第5條第1項規定公司董事會處理倂購交易時應 以全體股東之最大利益行爲,然而何謂最大利益亦非無疑問,以何種認定 標準判斷最大利益之內容,而利害關係人之利益在公司社會責任理論之下 係被鼓勵應予考慮的,惟在此一條文中則未受到規範,是否立法有意排除 或限縮無法從立法資料中獲得線索。本文擬以美國德拉瓦州最高法院自 1985年Revlon判決起所立下之Revlon Duty開始討論,在何種情形下公 司董事會於處理倂購交易事宜時應改變其身份而扮演類似拍賣官之角色, 以最高價格出售公司並使全體股東獲得短期利益之極大化,及在後續的 Paramount Communication, Inc v. Time, Inc.與 Paramount Communication Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.所確立的公司出售或控制權出售時之最大利益原則即Revbn/QVC DocWrn,以作爲我國企業倂購法第5條第1項解釋之參考。
The board of directors owes the fiduciary duties to the corporation and its whole shareholders. However, different shareholders have different purposes for their shareholding, therefore, it is usual for interests conflict among and between different shareholders and among shareholders and the corporate. Different shareholders will have different standards to consider what is the best interest for him. According to the Company Code and theories, the board of directors shall consider the corporate as a whole and all of its shareholders to make the decision to fulfill their fiduciary duties. Thus, how to interpret Section 5 subsection 1 of the Mergers and Acquisitions Act, which requires the board to consider the maximum interests of the shareholders when the board is making the decision regarding a M&A transaction, is a critical issue for the board. The author in this article will try to introduce the Delaware Supreme Court 1985 case, the Revlon case and the Revlon Duty, to discuss the duty to maximize the shareholders’ interests and under what kind of conditions the board will change their role into an auctioneer to get the highest price for its shareholders in the transaction. The author will further discuss the Revlon/QVC Doctrine which was established in following cases, Paramount Communication, Inc v. Time, Inc. and Paramount Communication Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. In this Doctrine, when the corporate is put for sale or constitute a sale of control, the Revlon Duty will be triggered, and the Delaware Supreme Court explain what is a “corporate for sale” or “sale of control”. The author thus will make a short comment on the Section 5 subsection 1 of the Mergers and Acquisitions Act.