比爾葛拉米（Akeel Bilgrami)認為在使用一個字詞時，只要此一使用可以被詮釋即可，因此其使用並不需要忠於該字詞過去的用法， 也因此他認為字詞的意義不具規範性。他還認為一旦意義不具規範 性，則克立普基（Saul Kripke)所謂的意義的懷疑論問題也就不成其 為問題。本文指出，其實比爾葛拉米本人的一些說法，與克立普基有 關意義的規範性的說法是類似的，因此在這意義下比爾葛拉米可說也 是贊同意義具有規範性的。更重要的是，本文也指出，只要可被詮釋 即可的對於字詞的使用的要求，與字詞的意義之具有規範性可以是相 容的。因此比爾葛拉米無法從字詞的使用不必忠於其過去的用法，得 到字詞的意義不具規範性的結論。比爾葛拉米還探討了所謂的麥克道爾（John McDowell)透過意向（intentions)這個概念所瞭解的意義的規範性，來說明字詞的意義也不具這個瞭解下的規範性。本文指出， 比爾葛拉米對於麥克道爾的解讀其實包含著許多的誤解。總結上述的 這些討論，我們認為比爾葛拉米既未成功地否定意義的規範性，也未 成功地說明何以意義的懷疑論問題不是個問題。

Akeel Bilgrami rejects the view that meanings are normative and hence further denies that Saul Kripke’s so-called meaning skepticism is really a problem. We contend that Bilgrami fails on both attempts, for the following reasons. As we point out, there is indeed a sense, one also accepted by Bilgrami, in which there are norms for the use of a word, and hence for the normativity of meaning. And while we may accept that the new use of a word may only need to be interpretable, and hence it does not have to accord with how it was used in the past, this is perfectly compatible with the normativity of meaning. And with the normativity of meaning thus left intact, Bilgrami cannot go on to claim that he has successfully shown that meaning skepticism is not really a problem.