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政治科學論叢 TSSCI

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篇名 選舉式威權政體:選舉競爭度、穩定性與民主化
卷期 57
並列篇名 Electoral Authoritarianism:Electoral Competitiveness, Stability, and Democratization
作者 李冠和
頁次 069-114
關鍵字 選舉式威權霸權式威權競爭式威權選舉競爭性政體穩定性Electoral AuthoritarianismHegemonic AuthoritarianismCompetitive AuthoritarianismElectoral CompetitivenessRegime StabilityTSSCI
出刊日期 201309
DOI 10.6166/TJPS.57(69-114)

中文摘要

摘 要
冷戰結束後,「選舉式威權」(electoral authoritarianism)成爲最普遍的威權政體型態,因此越來越多的研究開始探討選舉對於威權 政體的影響。然而學者們的看法分成了兩派:一派認爲選舉本質上是 威權統治者的工具,目的使威權政體更加穩固;另一派認爲選舉弱化 了威權統治,使民主化的可能性提高。威權政體的選舉是鞏固了威權 統治,還是弱化了威權政體?
本研究認爲選舉的作用會隨著不同的脈絡情境改變;而關鍵的脈 絡背景在於選舉競爭度的高低。低度競爭的政體,選舉能鞏固威權統 治;相反地,高度競爭的情況下,選舉才可能成爲民主化的助力。本 文以選舉式威權政體爲研究對象,收集1975〜2007年的時間序列橫 斷面資料,以檢驗本研究的論點。實證資料顯示,同樣舉行選舉但競 爭程度不同的「霸權式威權」(hegemonic authoritarianism)與「競 爭式威權」(competitive authoritarianism)存在動態性的差異。競爭 式威權政體不僅比霸權式威權政體較爲不穩定,同時也比較容易發生 民主化或是民主程度的倒退。

英文摘要

After the Cold War, electoral authoritarian regimes have become a modal type of authoritarian regime. As a result, an increasing number of studies have begun to explore the effect of elections on authoritarian regimes. However, there is disagreement between scholars on the effects of elections. One camp argues that such elections are an instrument used by rulers to stabilize authoritarian regimes; another camp argues that elections undermine authoritarian regimes and make democratization more likely. Do authoritarian elections foster or weaken authoritarian regimes?
This article argues that the function of elections depends on the context, and that the key contextual factor is the level of electoral competitiveness. Under low level electoral competition, elections consolidate authoritarian regimes. In contrast, under high level electoral competition, elections provide an opportunity structure for the opposition to achieve democratization. The main unit of analysis is electoral authoritarian regimes from 1975-2007. The research employs a time-series cross-sectional analysis to test the research hypotheses and discuss the dynamic differences between two subtypes of electoral authoritarianism: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive
authoritarianism. The two subtypes of authoritarianism both hold elections but their dynamic behaviors are distinct in terms of the level of electoral competitiveness. The empirical result reveals that competitive authoritarian regimes are unstable. In addition, they are not only more likely than hegemonic authoritarian regimes to democratize, but also more likely to undergo autocratic reversal.

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