本文分析當耐久財具備非遞延網路外部性時，獨佔廠商的定價行爲。當網路外部性存在時，消費者持有此耐久財的願付價格嚴格大於0，因此，交易會在有限的期間內結束。獨佔廠商在跨期價格歧視與加速交易進程之間做取捨，而非遞延網路外部性讓後者的好處增加，因此均衡的價格必定遞減。我們證明存在唯一的穩定 均衡。均衡的結果滿足Coase conjecture。而且，當網路外部性夠大時，廠商會選擇一個很低的價格立即結淸市場。本文也提供一些可以明確的計算出均衡價格與狀態（state)的例子。比較静態的結果顯示:網路外部性越犬，市場越快達到飽和。

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a monopoly in a durable goods market with non-delayed network effects. Network externalities ensure that each consumer will have a strictly positive willingness to pay for holding the goods, which in turn implies that the trading process must end within a finite time. The monopolist faces a trade-off between the respective benefits of price discrimination and accelerating the trading process, and the effect of the non-delayed network effects is to increase the latter benefit; therefore, equilibrium prices must decrease over time. We show that there exists a unique stationary equilibrium, and that the Coase conjecture holds in equilibrium. Furthermore, when the network effects are sufficiently strong, the monopolist will flood the market immediately. We also provide examples in which equilibrium prices and states can be explicitly computed. The comparative statics results suggest that the stronger the network effects, the more quickly the whole market will be covered.