本文以國內上市櫃公司普遍存在的核心代理問題為主軸，探討家族控制公司與其企業社會責任績效表現之關聯性。另外，由於資訊所建構的證券市場社會網絡結構是促進網絡成員互動的基礎，因此本文運用㈳會網絡理論，探討公司的「資訊揭露透明度」、「分析師預測頻率」，以及「機構投資人持股」差異，在本文研究架構中的干擾效果；以Logistic廻歸進行假說檢測。研究結果發現，家族控制公司與其企業社會責任績效存在正向且顯著的關係；顯示國內家族控制公司傾向支持利益收斂假說的觀點。此外，「資訊網絡透明度」可帶來網絡中心性的資訊利益，「分析師預測頻率」可產生資訊槓桿擴散的效果，以及「機構投資人持股」有助於促進精緻資訊分享與發揮監督力量，此三者對家族控制公司與其企業社會責任績效表現間關係，均存在正向干擾作用。本研究結果支持㈳會網絡鑲嵌的概念，可用以解釋證券市場成員的行動動機。

There is a general phenomenon of central agency problem in Taiwan listed
companies. This paper mainly explores the relationship between family control and corporate social performance. Besides, the information constitutes the structure of social network in an equity market which functions as the base of interaction among the actors. This study further tests separately transparency of information disclosure, the frequency of analysts’ earnings forecasts, and institutional ownership as a moderator. The empirical results indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between family-controlled firms and corporate social performance. Additionally, family-controlled firms with more transparency of information disclosure and the frequency of analysts’ earnings forecasts; they will have better corporate social performance. These findings indicate that the transparency of information networks can bring about benefits of network centrality; the frequency of analysts' earnings forecasts can result in leverage diffusion of information. Finally, family-controlled firms with higher ratio of institutional ownership, the better the corporate social performance will be. This finding explains how institutional investors can promote the sharing of fine-grained information as well as execute a supervisory role. The moderating effects of transparency of information disclosure, the frequency of analysts’ earnings
forecasts, and institutional ownership on the relationship between family control and corporate social performance are significantly positive. This study claims that the concept of social network embeddedness could depict the action motivation of actors in a capital market.