我國關係企業立法之初曾參考類似我國公司法第369條之4的控制公司補償及損害賠償法則的德國股份法(Aktiengesetz)第311條及第317條規定，從而若要分析檢討我國現行法第369條之4關於控制公司責任規範的應用，實有必要對其源起之德國法制加以了解。又我國公司法分別於2012年1月4日公布修正第8條規定，增訂第3項實質董事與形式上董事同負民事、刑事及行政罰之責任；2013年1月30日公布修正第154條規定，增訂第2項股東濫用公司法人地位對特定債務之債權人應負清償責任。是否上述責任的增訂將影響關係企業之控制公司責任規範的適用，亦是須先探討第369條之4控制公司補償及損害賠償責任的定位，而對此亦可從德國法之控制企業補償及損害賠償責任法則的立法目的與法界見解獲得分析判斷的理論基礎，從而本文將對德國法事實上關係企業之控制企業責任法制進行探討，期藉此以釐清我國關係企業控制公司之責任規範的定位，及其與公司法其他責任規範的關係。
本文首先探討關係企業規範的必要性及德國法關係企業規範的整體架構，藉此了解德國法對事實上關係企業之控制企業責任的法制安排，再進而檢討分析德國股份法第311條與第317條之補償及損害賠償責任法則的規範，包括控制企業使從屬公司為不利益經營之判斷時間點、判斷方式、不利益補償之性質、補償與賠償範圍之區別、控制企業之不利益影響是否應具備故意、舉證責任之分配、從屬公司債權人代位訴訟的前提等。之後探討德國股份法之補償及損害賠償責任法則為何不適用於從屬公司為有限公司之控制企業，及此時控制企業受到何種責任規範。此外，當從屬公司受控制企業高度不利益侵害時，由於前述之責任規範均不足以保障從屬公司及其少數股東及債權人，因此德國實務另發展出其他責任機制，亦為本文探討的重點。
藉由對德國控制企業責任法制之分析，得出我國公司法第369條之4控制公司之補償及賠償責任的定位，即是當控制公司使從屬公司為不利益經營時，只要控制公司還在得補償之期間內，不論是第8條第3項之實質董事責任或第154條第2項之股東外部責任均尚未能成立，須待控制公司未依規定補償後，方得進行檢視是否可於控制公司賠償責任外，尚另行成立實質董事責任或揭穿公司面紗之股東外部責任。

When the affiliate enterprise regulations of Taiwan’s Company Act were first enacted, the liability law of Germany’s Aktiengesetz, Articles 311 and 317 (similar to the compensation and damage liability of the controlling company in Taiwan’s Company Act, Article 369-4) was referenced. If the application of controlling company liability standards in Taiwan’s
Company Act, Article 369-4 is to be discussed, the source of these standards (i.e., the German legal system) must be understood. In addition, Taiwan’s Company Act, Article 8, Paragraph 3 was amended on January 4, 2012, to include a provision whereby a de facto or shadow director “shall be liable for the civil, criminal and administrative liabilities as a director in this Act.” Article 154, Paragraph 2 was amended on January 30, 2013, to “if a shareholder abuses the company’s status as a legal entity [...] the shareholder shall, if necessary, be liable for the debts.” To understand whether the addition of the above described responsibilities
affects the application of an affiliate enterprise’s controlling company liability standards, the positioning of controlling company compensation and damage liability in Taiwan’s Company Act, Article 369-4 must first be investigated. To achieve this objective, this study established a theoretical basis for analysis and judgment based on the German legal system’s controlling enterprise compensation and liability laws. Consequently, the researcher investigated the de facto affiliate enterprise-related controlling enterprise liability legislation in German law, endeavoring to clarify the positioning of Taiwan’s affiliate enterprise-related controlling company liability standards and their relationship with the other liability standards in the Company Act.
The present study explored why affiliate enterprise standards are necessary, and the overall framework of affiliate enterprise standards in German law, to understand the arrangement of affiliate enterprise-related controlling enterprise liability legislation in German law. The researcher then further discussed and analyzed the legislation standards regarding compensation and damage liability in Aktiengesetz, Articles 311 and 317. This included the judgment timeframe and methods when the controlling enterprise causes its subsidiary company to conduct unprofitable business or business that is contrary to normal business practices; the nature of compensation; the division and scope of compensation and damage liability; whether it is necessary that the harmful influences of the controlling enterprise proceed from intent; the allocation of the burden of proof; and the premises for derivative suits regarding the subsidiary company’s creditors. Subsequently, the reason the compensation and damage liability
laws in Aktiengesetz are not appropriate for controlling enterprises with subsidiary companies that are “the limited company” was explored, as well as liability standards for the controlling enterprises of a limited company. Because the mentioned liability standards were inadequate in protecting the subsidiary company and its minority shareholders and creditors, the German practice has developed additional accountability mechanisms for circumstances in which subsidiary companies are highly and harmfully infringed upon by the controlling enterprise. This is the primary focus of this study’s investigation. This study determined the positioning of the compensation and damage liability of the controlling company in Taiwan’s Company Act, Article 369-4 by analyzing Germany’s controlling enterprise liability law. If the controlling company has caused its subsidiary company to be placed under harmful management, and the controlling company pays an appropriate compensation within the compensation period, the liabilities of the de facto and shadow director (Article 8, Paragraph 3) or the personal liabilities of the shareholders for the company’s debts (Article 154, Paragraph 2) cannot occur. However, if the controlling company fails to pay an appropriate compensation, and, thus, causes the subsidiary company to suffer damages, the controlling company is liable for damages. In addition, under this situation the controlling company may also engender the liabilities of the de facto and shadow director or the personal liabilities of the shareholders (piercing the corporate veil).