本研究從中央－地方關係的角度闡釋中國大陸地方政府推動國有企業民營化的原因。我們認為，正是1990年代中期兩項重大中央政策的變化（分稅制與金融改革）造成了中央－地方關係發生轉變，致使地方政府對轄區內國有企業的誘因結構受到衝擊。在這一背景下，國有企業對地方政府的「價值」下降。具體表現為：國有企業對地方政府的財政貢獻下降；持續維持和保護虧損國有企業的成本增加；國有企業對地方政府產生的負擔加重。因此，民營化國有企業成為地方政府的理性選擇。

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the cause of privatization of
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s in terms of the
change between central and local government relations. We conclude that the
two central policies – tax sharing reform and banking reform – that change
the incentives between central authority and local governments, and this
change exerts an important effect upon the cost-benefit structure of local
governments. Under the circumstance, the value of SOEs on local governments is decremented. This depreciation is due to the immensely declining financial supply of SOEs to local governments, increasingly expensive upholding cost of local governments to SOEs, and the exorbitant social burdens of inefficient SOEs on local public finance. Therefore, privatization of SOEs becomes a rational strategy among local governments’
options.