中國近年來有許多新興的公共治理經驗，其中最有民主意涵且受到最多國內外關注的，厥為浙江省台州市溫嶺的「參與式預算」改革。本文擬藉對此案例的研究，來回答一個更大的問題，即在中國目前的環境下，具民主意涵的治理改革是否及如何可能？什麼是其出現的條件，其維持的動力又可能來自何方？本文引用了三種制度論（歷史制度論、社會學制度論、及理性選擇制度論）來觀察X 鎮的案例。本文發現，三種制度論都可以被用來解釋制度創發後的現象。譬如，參與式預算的制度創發後產生了利益的博弈，博弈後又產生了參與者對此制度的路徑依賴，也產生新的社會網絡，並回頭形成了當地的政治文化，形成某種社會符號的意義，這些都會對往後的制度變遷產生影響。但三種制度論對於制度一開始如何產生卻都顯得有其不足之處。本文研究發現，X 鎮之所以出現這樣一個案例具有相當的偶然性，在一開始既非由政治菁英自上而下推動，亦非社會力量自下而上衝撞，而是由某些被本文稱為「政治企業家（political entrepreneur）的人物在地方奔走串連推動而成。然而，一旦此一制度出現後，便成為一個可進行利益博弈的「局」，各方力量便進入此局進行博弈，並且形成了一個多次博弈的局面，因而各方力量在此達致某種利益交換的均衡。一旦如此，這個「參與式預算」的制度便具有其自身內在的可持續生命力，因而不再是一個短暫的現象。

There are many new models of public governance emerged in recent years in China. One of the cases with democratic implications that have received most attention is the “participatory budget reform” in Wenling, Zhejiang. This paper intends to respond to a larger theoretical question by examining this case. The larger question is: How is any reform with democratic implications possible under current circumstances in China? What are the conditions that contribute to such reform, and where do the dynamisms that create such reform come from? This paper applies three schools of institutionalism to examine the case（historical,sociological, and rational institutionalism）. This paper finds that all three institutionalisms are applicable in explaining how the institution of “participatory budget reform” evolves once it was established. However, they all appear to be insufficient in explaining how the institution emerged from the very beginning. The paper finds that a group of “political entrepreneurs” played important roles in making possible the emergence of this institution. They mobilize political resources and explore possibility under the constraints of existing political institutions. However, once the institution has taken place, the institution allows various social groups and villages to form a “game” so that they can bargain among themselves to seek a balance of their multiple interests. Once the equilibrium is reached within such a game, the institution can obtain an internal balance, and the institution becomes no longer a temporary reform.