本文試圖從中國西部農村中村幹部作為國家與社會之「中介者」角色的歷史演變，論證不論國家政策如何變動，中介者作為「雙重代理人」的自主性從來未曾消失，中介者的利益動機與行為對地方治理具有關鍵影響。2000年以來，中共針對三農問題下猛藥，稅費改革、取消農業稅及一連串惠農補貼政策，中央意在跳過這基層代理人的剝削，使中央對社會的照顧能直補到戶。政策的非預期結果是鄉鎮被虛級化，國家基層政權上提至縣，在新的形勢下，「國家」再次退出農村，為村（地方）自治提供新契機，村幹部作為農村的「家長」，其角色扮演使地方治理成效出現分化，有些地區呈現無政府狀態，有些地方在村幹部的帶領下，利用巿場與政策的機會，走向良性治理。

In 2000, China’s central government noticed the severity of its rural
development problems and started to implement reforms. The adoption of the
tax-for-fee policy and the abolition of the agricultural tax were meant to
relieve the heavy burden of peasants and to constrain the predatory behaviors of local cadres. The unintended consequence of these reforms was the withdrawal of power from the township government, leaving villages
neglected by the state. On the other hand, villages gained renewed
opportunities for self governance. In the absence of power, village cadres
were free to resume their paternalistic roles and consequently their style of leadership had a profound impact on local governance. In some areas, local governance was anarchic, while in others villages developed by taking
advantage of new polices and markets. This paper argues that the roles played by village cadres have been critical to the performance of local governance in less developed areas of rural China. As intermediaries between the state and society, the autonomy of the village cadres remained intact despite changes in state policies.