中國貪腐問題是當前中國治理上的重大難題。過去研究開發中國家的貪腐問題主要從「巿場或民主（制度）轉型」、國家「權力過度集中」及「國家能力」衰弱等角度分析，在解釋中國的貪腐問題時皆有所不足，顯示中國的情況與一般發展中國家並不相同。目前雖然有不少研究論及中國的情況，惟單獨探討中國貪腐問題者仍屬少數，Barrett L. McCormick（1990）、Melanie Manion（2004）、Minxin Pei
（2006）及Xiaobo Lu（2000）在分析中國的貪腐問題時，雖然同意中國歷經巿場轉型與中央與地方關係轉變（地方分權），使地方有更多貪腐尋租的機會與誘因，然而中國貪腐問題的出現與未來發展前景係深受列寧式黨國體制因素所制約。四位作者著重的角度不同，對於中國貪腐問題的發生邏輯與後果則有不同的分析內涵，但加入體制因素分析對於中國貪腐問題的性質確實更有解釋力。

It is recognized that the issue of corruption has been becoming more
serious in China. Although China’s Central government has taken some
action to deal with this problem, it remains doubtful whether this has been
effective. Most literature on corruption in developing countries has adopted theories about market transition, power concentration, and weak state capabilities as explanatory tools. However, while partially useful, these theories still have explanatory weaknesses. In addition, there is little reference in the literature to the issue of corruption in China, issue of which has arisen in different circumstances to other developing countries. The four books under review – Barrett L. McCormick (1990), Melanie Manion (2004), Minxin Pei (2006), Xiaobo Lu (2000) – all agree
that due to market transition and the transformation of relations between
central and local governments, local cadres are provided with more chances
and incentive to be corruptive. Nevertheless, they emphasize the role of the Leninist party state system in bringing about the corruption problems as well as constraining its future solution. The four authors look at the party state system from different angles and have therefore come to different conclusions. The more persuasive arguments in explaining China’s
corruption problem are those that consider the role of the party state system.