本研究主要檢視委託書制度所可能衍生之控制權偏離及代理問題，委託書之董事選舉權設計，原係賦予公司股東可經由委託書授與，對於經營不善之現任管理者發揮監督功能，惟此項制度設計亦使少數股東無須購買股權即可取得公司控制權，造成控制權與現金流量權偏離之經濟後果。本研究由證券期貨局建置之委託書公告系統取得2002年至2005年間改選董事及徵求委託書資料，實證檢測徵求委託書與董事席次控制權偏離情形，本文發現徵求委託書與控制股東董事席次權與現金流量權偏離具有統計上顯著正相關，顯示相對於未徵求委託書公司，徵求委託書公司在控制股東董事席次權與現金流量權偏離程度顯著為高。此外，本文分別採用不同型態之關係人交易、轉投資損益及處分轉投資損益作為小股東權益被侵占之代理變數，觀察與徵求委託書相關性，結果顯示徵求委託書公司具有顯著較高關係人財產交易損失，及較低之轉投資損益及處分轉投資損益。最後，本文考量董事股權對緩和委託書公司不當侵占之效果，研究發現董事股權較高者，關係人應收借支占資產比率較低及轉投資收益占營收比率較高，傾向支持利益收斂假說。

This research aims to investigate the implications of the proxy contest on the separation of ownership and control and agency problems in Taiwan. The design of the director’s suffrage in the proxy was meant to give the shareholders authority to oversee the management teams. However, such design also enables certain shareholders acquire substantial board control right without holding a large stake of company shares, and may therefore cause a negative economical outcome. Using a dataset of 1,066 corporations which had elected directors in 2002 to 2005, this research finds a greater divergence between controlling shareholders’ control over the board seats and their ownership when the companies solicit the proxy for board seats. In addition, this research adopts various forms of related party transactions, investments income, and income on disposal of investments for expropriation of minor shareholders wealth. The findings show that companies soliciting the proxy possess higher related party property transaction loss, lower investment income, andlower income on disposal of investments. Finally, this research takes into account the moderating effect of director’s share ownership on proxy contest and minority shareholders wealth, and finds that a high level of director ownership adds to increase the investment income and the income on disposal of investments, supporting the convergence of interest hypothesis.