Diamond and Dybvig(1983)發現存款保險不但可避免存戶擠兌、防堵金融危機的發生，透過採行最適的存款保險，甚至可使社會福利達到極大，不過，該文沒有考慮存款保險對經濟成長的影響。本文考慮了經濟內生成長的架構，發現存款保險將得以阻止單純由民眾預期所引發的銀行擠兌事件，最終有利於長期經濟成長。透過數值分析，我們發現:使得社會福利極大的最適存款保險為部分保障，而Diamond and Dybvig(1983)沒有考慮到存款保險提高經濟成長這項對社會福利的正面影響，導致該文低估最適的存款保險額度。

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) discovered that deposit insurance can prevent
both bank runs and financial crises. Moreover, demand deposits might
achieve the equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. However, Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) neglected the growth effect of deposit insurance. This
paper considers endogenous growth and finds that deposit insurance can
prevent bank runs due to random withdrawals, resulting in a higher rate of
economic growth. Through a simulation, this paper concludes that the optimal
deposit insurance to maximize social welfare only offers partial protection,
and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) underestimated this optimal deposit
insurance since they did not consider the growth effect of deposit insurance.