信用評等是專業團體評估公司未來財務狀況與續效的一項指標，信用評等之結果也可視為高階經理人是否善盡管理及經營責任的一項指標。本文以2006 年至2010 年台灣上市櫃非金融業公司為樣本，以信用評等指標作為衡量經理人績效之非財務指標，採討當公司被調降(升)信評之後，是否會影響高階經理人之薪酬，並進一步採討董事會獨立性、獨立董事專業性與參與度對此聞聯性之調節效果。實證結果發現，當公司信用評等被調降(井)時，經理人薪酬會被調降(升)，且由低風險等級調降至高風險等級時，其調降幅度更明顯，本文亦進一步採用分量迴歸(quantile regression) 檢測，發現經理人薪酬位於高分量值時，其調降(升)幅度更明顯。當董事會獨立性愈高、獨立董事愈具專業度及參與度愈高時，愈能發揮監督功能，因此在調降信評後，薪酬被調降之幅度更高;而信用評等調降(升)之理由各有不同，實證結果亦發現當公司因為營運狀況變差(好)而被調降(升)信評時，其薪酬調降(升)幅度大於其他調降理由。

The credit rating is an index of the firm’s financial condition and performance rated by a professional institute, and it can also be considered an indicator of executives’ accountability and stewardship. Using a sample of Taiwan listed companies (excluding the financial industry) from 2006 to 2010, this study examines the relation between credit rating downgrades and CEO compensation, and the moderating effects of board independence, expertise, and attendance. The empirical results show a decrease (increase) in CEO compensation following company credit rating downgrades (upgrades), and the relation becomes more significant when the credit rating changes from low to high risk. In addition, quantile regression tests find that the magnitude of the decrease (increase) grows when CEO compensation is in a high quantile. The greater the independence, expertise, and attendance of a company’s board, the more efficient the company will be. After a company’s credit rating is downgraded, CEO compensation is also decreased. Credit ratings are downgraded (upgrades) for various reasons and the results also show that the reduction (increasing) in the range of CEO compensation is greater when downgrades (upgrades) are due to the state of operations.