本篇論文針對物理學中「力」概念形成初期，笛卡兒和萊布尼茲之間對這一概念形而上理解的同異，做一比較與批評，並藉由萊布尼茲與笛卡兒主義者間關於力度量的爭議，說明在不同的自然形上基礎之下，能產生如何不同的科學理論。筆者同時分析論證，正由於這一不同的自然形上基礎，使得上述爭議無法達成和解。進而透過這一實例，說明自然的形上認識，如何在歷史上就已經先決地進入科學知識之中，並對科學理論產生決定性的影響。

The controversy over the true nature of material beings in early modern times has had great influence on the subsequent development of natural science. One of the major discussions of the time was the dispute over the measure of force between the followers of Leibniz and Descartes. Today it is still often seen as a meaningless verbal dispute, since there are no empirical criteria for the mathematical formulation of force as a metaphysical concept. In this paper I argue that these disagreements must be attributed to the metaphysical view of nature. The difference of opinion is not only in the evaluation of nature through mathematics but also in the understanding of the concept of force and thus the deep insight into the metaphysics of nature as a whole. In addition, I argue that Leibniz has a much deeper understanding of nature and its metaphysical basis than the Cartesians do. Thus the controversy is not a meaningless verbal dispute but a metaphysically-based subject worthy of discussion.