克利佛德在他的〈信念倫理〉中主張「在不充分的證據上相信任何意見就是錯的」。本文檢視了詹姆士在〈信念意志〉中對於克利佛德之主張的三個知識論批評，並且指出：詹姆士這三個批評包含有有道理的主張，然而這三個批評的效力的確只足以約束對於克利佛德的主張的詮釋，而不足以完全推翻之；事實上詹姆士也不應該會是企圖完全推翻之，因為他與克利佛德其實共同同意一些實質的知識論主張，例如兩人都同意「智性理據扮演為個人信念提供證成的角色」，而這個主張正是克利佛德的主張的核心成分。

This paper interprets and evaluates James’s three epistemological criticisms in his “The Will to Believe” of Clifford’s conclusion in his “The Ethics of Belief” that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” It is pointed out that James’s criticisms contain plausible theses, even though they fail to overthrow, and can only moderate, Clifford’s conclusion. It is also pointed out that James should not be interpreted as aiming to overthrow Clifford’s conclusion completely, because he shares with Clifford certain substantial epistemological theses, such as that intellectual factors like evidence play the role of providing justification for beliefs, and it is clear that the latter thesis is central to Clifford’s conclusion.