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政治科學論叢 TSSCI

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篇名 葡萄牙「不完全議會化的半總統制」:制度與非制度的分析
卷期 60
並列篇名 “Incomplete Parliamentalized Semi-Presidentialism” in Portugal: Institutional and Non-institutional Analysis*
作者 顏煌庭
頁次 085-120
關鍵字 葡萄牙芬蘭半總統制不完全議會化PortugalFinlandSemi-PresidentialismIncomplete ParliamentarizationTSSCI
出刊日期 201406
DOI 10.6166/TJPS.60(85-120)

中文摘要

本文透過「議會化指標」的建構,從制度因素與非制度因素分別檢驗修憲後的葡萄牙是否在這兩面向朝向議會化的方向運作,導出葡萄牙屬於「不完全議會化的半總統制」。1974年康乃馨革命,葡萄牙進入半總統制家族。1982年葡萄牙進行大幅度修憲,總統影響力下降。然而,「制度的不完全議會化」導致總統持續扮演否決者的角色。另一方面,「總理總統化」與政黨體系轉型關l導致「非制度的議會化」,鞏固內閣與國會之間的關係。奠基於葡萄牙的實證經驗,本文也探討制度與非制度其中類的議會化,對於半總統制演化的啟發。套用「議會化指標」檢驗芬蘭半總統制演化方向,透過葡萄牙與芬蘭的比較,導出「議會化的半總統制」關鍵在於制度因素。然而,「制度的不完全議會化下」,總統的實質影響力會受到「非制度的議會化」限制。本文結論對於「跨國性案例檢驗」、「總統化指標建構」、權力朝向總統、內閣還是國會運作,或半總統制國家的民主穩定研究都有重要的關聯。

英文摘要

This study assesses whether Portugal moved toward institutional and noninstitutional parliamentarization following constitutional change by constructing indicators of parliamentarization, showing that Portugal developed an “incomplete parliamentarized semi-presidentialism.” Due to the outbreak of Carnation Revolution at 1976, Portugal entered into the family of semipresidentialism. After constitutional reform in 1982, the powers of the president under new constitutional framework decreased. However, “incomplete institutional parliamentarization” meant that presidents were still veto players. In addition, “complete non-institutional parliamentarization” consolidated the relationship between cabinet and parliament through prime ministerial presidentialization and the transformation of party system. Based on the experience in Portugal, the article also addresses the relationship between complete institutional or non-institutional parliamentarization and the transformation of semi-presidentialism. After applying indicators of parliamentarization to Finland and comparing with the case of Portugal, the article concludes that institutional rather than non-institutional factors contribute to “complete parliamentarized semi-presidentialism.” However, presidential effects under “incomplete institutional parliamentarization” can be restricted by “complete non-institutional parliamentarization.” For future research, these results can be applied to cross-national case studies, indicators of presidentialization, power distribution between presidents, cabinets or parliaments and democratic stability in semi-presidential countries.

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