本研究測試經理人是否操弄盈餘以達到年度盈餘門檻，即避免列報損失、盈餘較去年度衰退及未符合分析師預期。本研究不僅測試此三種盈餘門檻之八種不同組合情境，亦測試正好符合或正好未符合此三種盈餘門檻的盈餘管理程度。除進行同組門檻內之比較外，亦作跨門檻之比較。研究結果顯示，針對三種盈餘門檻之八種不同組合情境，無證據顯示經理人員對任何一種組合情境有盈餘管理現象；在某些情境下，經理人員甚至操弄盈餘向下。而跨組合情境之比較結果顯示：(a)達到三門檻相較於未達到三門檻，(b)達到三門檻相較於報導損失，以及(c)避免報導損失相較於未達到三門檻有增額盈餘管理之傾向。另外，針對正好符合或正好未符合此三種盈餘門檻情境（縮減樣本）之測試結果顯示，其盈餘管理程度依序為：(1)符合分析師預期，(2)避免盈餘較去年度衰退，以及(3)避免列報損失。

This paper examines whether managers manipulate annual earnings to meet earnings thresholds, i.e. zero earnings, prior year’s earnings, and analysts’ expectations. For the eight mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive situations of meeting/missing the three earnings thresholds, the results show no evidence that managers manipulate earnings upwards to exclusively meet/miss an individual threshold, even in some situations they manipulate earnings downwards. However, the comparison across thresholds shows that incremental earnings management exists in the following cases: (a) meeting all three goals versus missing all three goals; (b) meeting all three goals versus reporting losses; and (c) avoiding losses versus missing all three goals. Furthermore, we examine a reduced sample where companies just meet/miss the goals. In this reduced sample, we find that the most earnings management is done to meet analysts’ earnings expectations, followed by avoiding earnings decreases, and then to avoid showing losses.