本文分析兩污染廠商間之技術移轉決策。其中擁有較先進防汙技術之廠商須決定要分享多少技術給落後的廠商,而技術落後的廠商則須決定要採納多少先進廠商所釋放出來的技術。本文和既存文獻的分析有兩點主要差異：首先，本文探討「比例責任制」的廠商汙染傷害賠償,而非文獻常假設的「嚴格責任」或「過失主義」。其次，本文模型中加入技術移轉成本，此為過去文獻所無。本文發現,廠商防汙技術之分享與接納程度均與汙染傷害之函數型式和技術移轉成本有關。只有當汙染傷害為線型,且技術移轉沒有成本時，市場均衡才具有效率性。否則，均衡下之廠商技術移轉程度皆低於社會最適。

We analyze in this paper the technology diffusion decisions of two polluting firms. Firm 1, armed with superior pollution abatement technology, must decide on how much technology to share with firm 2. Meanwhile, firm 2 must determine how much of the available technology to adopt. Though inspired by Endres and Friehe (2011), which investigates a related issue under environmental laws of strict liability and negligence rules, this paper differs crucially in two fundamental aspects: we consider a proportional liability rule and costly technology diffusion. We find that the decision to release or adopt more advanced technology hinges on the form of external damage as well as the existence of diffusion costs. Only when external damage is linear and technology diffusion is free will the market equilibrium be efficient.