由於掏空公司資產事件層出不窮，對組織造成嚴重傷害，因此公司治理機制被認為是可以保護股東與相關利益關係人的重要工具。由於家族企業與非家族企業的本質不同，本研究比較機構所有權、獨立董事、董事長與總經理內部化之公司治理機制對家族企業與非家族企業績效的影響。由於不同類型的機構所有權會帶來不同的代理關係與資源，因此更進一步區分為友好法人所有權、最終控制者的法人所有權、外部法人所有權。本研究整合代理理論與資源依賴理論，並以台灣的上市公司於2008-2011年為例，研究結果顯示：(1)友好法人所有權對家族企業與非家族企業的績效均具有正向效果；(2)最終控制者的法人所有權對家族企業無顯著效果，但是對非家族企業具有正向效果；(3)外部法人所有權對家族企業的績效無正向效果，但是對非家族企業具有正向效果；(4)獨立董事對家族企業的績效具有正向效果，但是對非家族企業無顯著效果；(5)董事長與總經理內部化對家族企業的績效無顯著效果，但是對非家族企業具有正向效果。

Since tunnelling listed corporations by controlling shareholders has been regareded as a serious problem, researches have suggested to use different types of corporate governance mechanisms to protect minority shareholders’ interests and to improve firm performance. Due to the very different natures between busienss-owned and non-family-owned business, this study compares the relationships between institutional ownership ties, independent directors, the internalization of chairmans and presidents, and organizational performance of family-owned and non-family-owned business. Given the fact that different institutional ownership ties are related to different agency relationships and external resources, this study further separates institutional ownership ties into three types: prior-partner institutional ownership, ultimate-controllingparty institutional ownership, and outsider institutional ownership. This study integrates the agency theory and the resource dependency theory to compare the effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of family-owned and non-family-owned business, based on a sample of Taiwanese listed corporations from 2008-2011. The study has the following findings: (1) prior-partner institutional ownership has a positive impact on the performance of familyowned and non-family-owned business; (2) ultimate-controllingparty institutional ownership has a positive impact on the performance of non-family-owned business, rather than on that of family-owned business; (3) outsider institutional ownership has a positive impact on the performance of non-family-owned business, rather than on that of family-owned business; (4) independent directors have a positive impact on the performance of family-owned business, rather than on that of non-family-owned business; (5) the internalization of chairmans and presidents has a positive impact on the performance of non-familyowned business, rather than on that of family-owned business.