本文探討Tyler Burge的一項主張：知覺(perception)劃定了表徵心智(representational mind)的下限，並展現出最初步的客觀性。根據這項主張，知覺是最初始的表徵類型，並且正確的知覺乃是將各種性質準確歸屬給獨立於心智的物理世界。我將這主張稱之為「起始命題」(the Primitive Thesis)。本文的目標是要以視覺(visual perception)為範圍來攻擊「起始命題」。我將論證：視覺不是最初始的客觀表徵類型。這並不會完全駁倒「起始命題」，但會使它最顯著的適用範圍失效。我採取跨領域的進路，指出目前最佳並相關的經驗研究認為：個體如何表徵自己的身體狀況，在實現知覺的生物性功能(biological functions)的事上，扮演了關鍵角色。我接著論證：劃定客觀表徵之下限的不是視覺，而是身體表徵(body representation)。因此，視覺並不是客觀性的起始點。最後，我將根據本文的討論，對知覺提出一些綜合看法。

In this paper, I discuss a specific claim by Tyler Burge that perception delineates the lower border of representational mind and exhibits the most basic form of objectivity (2010). According to this claim, perception is the most primitive type of representation that, when veridical, accurately attributes properties to the mind-independent physical world. I will call this view the Primitive Thesis. My goal in this paper is to argue against the Primitive Thesis in the case of visual perception. I argue that visual perception is not the most primitive type of objective representation. This will not refute the Thesis completely, but it would undermine the most prominent case for the Thesis. My approach will be interdisciplinary. I show that the current best empirical accounts strongly suggest that how perceivers represent their bodily conditions plays a key role in the biological functions of perception. Then I argue that the lower border of objective representation is not given by visual perception, but by body representation. Visual perception is not the origin of objectivity. Based on this investigation, I will conclude with some remarks on perception in general.