本研究建立「管理授權—誘因契約—數量競爭」的三階段賽局模 型,研究在一般化廠商家數下,市場均衡時之管理授權型態。廠商擁 有者在賽局第一階段同時決定是否要聘雇專業經理人,而決定要聘 雇專業經理人的廠商擁有者, 在賽局第二階段, 同時決定授權給經 理人經營之誘因契約, 在賽局第三階段, 廠商擁有者與專業經理人, 依其個別目標同時決定其個別產量。在線性的需求與對稱的成本函 數之下, 若市場上存在3家以上的廠商, 當聘僱經理人的成本較高、 市場規模較小, 或是生產成本較高時,所有廠商都「不聘雇經理人」; 當聘僱經理人的成本較低、市場規模較大,或是生產成本較低時,所 有廠商都「聘雇經理人」; 當聘僱經理人的成本、市場規模, 或是生 產成本適中時, 部份廠商「聘雇經理人」, 而其餘廠商「不聘雇經理 人」, 在特定條件之下, 此混合授權型態中, 聘僱經理人廠商的均衡 數量與利潤, 如同Stackelberg 模型的數量領導者, 而不聘僱經理人 廠商的均衡數量與利潤,如同Stackelberg模型的數量跟隨者。

This study investigates a three-stage game of delegation choice, incentive contract choice, and subsequent quantity choice with a general number of firms. Profit-maximizing owners of firms choose whether to delegate or not to delegate in the first stage, and those firms that choose to delegate decide their incentive contract in the second stage. In the third stage, the owners or managers compete in quantity according to their respective objectives. With linear demand functions and symmetric cost functions, we show that if there are more than three firms in the market and the cost of hiring a manager and production costs are relatively high, or the market size is relatively small, then all firms choose not to delegate. If the costs of hiring a manager and production cost are relatively low, or the market size is relatively large, then all firms choose to delegate. If the cost of hiring a manager, production costs, or the market size is relatively moderate, then some firms choose to delegate, while the others choose not to delegate. In this case, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium will coincide with the Stackelberg solution.